欧洲的原罪-酷悠
Europe’s Original Sin-cuyoo
发布者：admin
时间:2010-03-06 23:33点击:次
欧 洲指责华尔街安排的金融交易把希腊带到了需要救赎的边缘。但仔细看看希腊加入欧元区后近10年来的财政状况，发现不仅希腊自己一手制造了其债务问题，而且其它欧洲国家政府也屡屡对希腊违反规定的作法睁一只眼闭一只眼。 虽然欧洲委员会(European Commissio
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Europeans are blaming financial transactions arranged by Wall Street for bringing Greece to the brink of needing a bailout. But a close look at the country's finances over the nearly 10 years since it adopted the euro shows not only that Greece was the principal author of its debt problems, but also that fellow European governments repeatedly turned a blind eye to its flouting of rules. Though the European Commission and the U.S. Federal Reserve are examining a controversial 2001 swap arranged with Goldman Sachs Group Inc., Greece's own budget moves, in clear breach of European Union rules, dwarfed the effect of such deals. Predicaments of the sort Greece is facing-years of overspending, leaving bond investors worried the country can't pay back its debts-weren't supposed to happen in the euro zone. Early on, countries made a pact aimed at preventing a free-spending state from undermining the common currency. The pact required countries adopting the euro to limit annual budget deficits to 3% of gross domestic product, and total government debt to 60% of GDP. But an examination of budget reports to the EU shows Greece hasn't met the deficit rule in any year except 2006. It has never been within 30 percentage points of the debt ceiling. Greece has revised its deficit figures, always upward, every year since 1997-often considerably. Several times, the final figure was quadruple what was first reported. Late last year, the Greek government set in motion its current crisis by increasing its 2009 budget-deficit estimate, initially 3.7% of GDP, to nearly 13% of GDP. Those revisions far exceed the impact of controversial derivative transactions Greece used to help mask the size of its debt and deficit numbers. The 2001 currency-swap deal arranged by Goldman trimmed Greece's deficit by about a 10th of a percentage point of GDP for that year. By comparison, Greece failed to book 1.6 billion ($2.2 billion) of military expenses in 2001-10 times what was saved with the swap, according to Eurostat, the EU's statistics authority. The Greek problem has shown that EU financial institutions don't have enough teeth or expertise to rein in renegade member states, said Jean-Pierre Jouyet, chairman of France's stock-market watchdog and former chief of staff to a president of the European Commission, Jacques Delors. 'We need new tools to manage these disequilibriums, because a pact without sanctions is not enough,' said Mr. Jouyet. Constantine Papadopoulos, secretary-general for international economic affairs at the Greek foreign ministry, said Greece entered the euro zone legitimately. 'The notion that Greece 'cheated' to get into the euro zone is one of those notions that has stuck in people's minds in Europe and, being the well-crafted piece of propaganda that it is, is extremely difficult to reverse,' he said. Mr. Papadopoulos, a member of the now-ruling Socialist party, said most of the revisions took place because an incoming New Democracy government in 2004 retrospectively revised the way it dealt with military spending. That, he said, had an impact on the recorded budget deficit for the past years of the Socialist government. But Eurostat deemed those revisions necessary, since Greece had 'widely underestimated' its military spending. The Aegean country wasn't alone in breaking the euro zone's rules: A majority of other euro-zone members also failed to meet the debt and deficit requirements at least once over several years, the reports show. The euro's launch, with 11 founding members in 1999 and Greece joining 18 months later, amounted to a deliberate political gesture by European leaders: Membership in the fledgling currency should be as broad as possible. Italy and Belgium were allowed in with the first group despite well exceeding the debt threshold-a decision that spurred some controversy. Bringing in Greece, the ancient 'cradle of democracy,' was symbolically important. In any case, by the late 1990s Greece was being billed as a great economic turnaround story and few eyebrows were raised. Greece's current crisis-which has weakened the euro and sown concerns about the debt levels of some other European countries-shows Europe's political ambitions for a broad euro are clashing with economic realities. It also suggests Greece's economic success was partly a mirage created by misreported economic statistics. This is a consequence of a weakness that economists and historians say was built into the common currency at birth: the lack of a coordinated fiscal policy to go with monetary union. From the beginning, the euro has been replete with unresolved tensions, says David Marsh, author of 'The Euro,' a 2009 book chronicling the birth of the currency. The currency union was seen by some politicians as a way to pull the EU toward political union; others, mainly in Germany, emphasized the need for fiscal and monetary rectitude. Once a country is in the currency, little can be done to a wayward member because the euro's architects built in no real means of enforcement. That's in part because of a compromise made in a 1996 European summit in Dublin that placed the decision whether to levy fines on errant governments with other EU governments. That was a victory for Jacques Chirac, then French president, over German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, who wanted the fines to be automatic. Since then no country has been fined. Willem Buiter, chief economist at Citigroup and a former member of the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England, described the 1996 agreement aimed at enforcing the debt and deficit rules as 'a paper tiger.' 'It is ineffective, because for a while it created the illusion that there were sticks and carrots capable of changing the fiscal behavior of the member states, when in reality there were neither,' he wrote in a new research report. The lax attitude to fiscal rules began early. Eager to get the euro in place in the late 1990s, EU leaders decided 1997 would be the key year. If everyone could meet the targets for that year, the currency could be launched. The 60% debt goal was simply out of reach-Belgium, for instance, had debt equaling 131% of GDP in 1995. The countries agreed excess debt was acceptable, so long as it appeared to be shrinking. (The euro zone as a whole has never met the 60% debt limit.) Instead, Europe tried to stand firm on the annual deficits. That triggered a busy year of one-off boosts to government coffers. Countries sold mobile-phone spectrum licenses. France got a payment of more than 5 billion for assuming future pension obligations from the soon-to-be-privatized France Télécom. Germany tried, but failed, to revalue its gold reserves. Buoyed by these maneuvers-and helped by the tech boom-11 of the 12 countries made the 3% goal for 1997. With much fanfare, the euro was born as the clock ticked from 1998 to 1999, though notes and coins didn't begin circulating for another three years. With much less fanfare, countries later revised their numbers: Of the original 11 entrants that qualified on the basis of their 1997 data, three-Spain, France and Portugal-later revised their 1997 deficit figures to above 3%. France's budget revision, to 3.3%, wasn't made until 2007. Greece didn't make the first wave. Its 4.0% deficit in 1997 missed by too much. Even then, technocrats doubted Greek statistics. But in late 1999, eager to keep the euro zone on track, the EU overlooked those concerns. The figures for 1998 appeared better, and European governments agreed that Greece had met the fiscal goals. They cited a reduction in its deficit to 2.5% of GDP in 1998 and a projection of 1.9% for 1999, and saluted Greece for reducing its debt. 'The deficit was below the Treaty reference value in 1998 and is expected to remain so in 1999 and decline further in the medium term,' the governments proclaimed in December 1999. None of that turned out to be true. In March 2000, Eurostat said a new accounting standard pushed Greece's 1998 deficit up to 3.2%. Later, in a 2004 report, Eurostat added nearly 2 billion to the original 1998 deficit-largely because Greece had wrongly deemed subsidies to state entities as equity purchases, a device Portugal would later use. In the end, the 1998 figure stood at 4.3%, well above the euro-zone entry criterion. It got worse. Eurostat found that Greece barely recorded any expenditure on military equipment for years, routinely overestimated tax collections, didn't record hospital costs in the state health system and counted EU subsidies to private entities in Greece as government revenue. In the face of an economic downturn, others joined the Greeks. France and Germany breached the deficit limit in 2002, 2003 and 2004, setting the example that even the bloc's economic powerhouses didn't have to play by the rules. In 2003, the Netherlands and Italy did too. 'When Germany and France got into difficulty, there was not a strong reaction from the European Union,' says Jean-Luc Dehaene, a former Belgian prime minister. Of the 12 early members of the euro, all but Belgium, Luxembourg and Finland have overrun the budget rule at least once. Finally, under political pressure, the norms were softened in 2005 to allow the deficit limit to be breached in an economic downturn. That was after the tragicomic tale of Greece's 2003 deficit. In March 2004, Greece reported that its 2003 deficit had been 2.6 billion, or 1.7% of GDP. Eurostat put in a footnote calling the figure 'provisional,' but it was still well below the euro-zone average of 2.7%. Any Greek celebration was short-lived. Two months later, under pressure from Eurostat, Greece put out new figures. The 2003 deficit was now 3.2%, thanks in part to overestimated tax receipts and EU subsidies. Four months after that, it was up to 4.6%: Greece had failed to include some military expenses, overestimated a social-security surplus, and low-balled its interest expenses. Another revision in March 2005 kicked it up to 5.2%. Later that year, it became 5.7%. What had been reported 18 months earlier as an 2.6 billion deficit was now 8.8 billion. In short, says Vassilis Monastiriotis of the London School of Economics, Greece 'failed to internalize the logic of the euro zone-which is fiscal discipline.' Charles Forelle / Stephen Fidler 本文涉及股票或公司
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欧
洲指责华尔街安排的金融交易把希腊带到了需要救赎的边缘。但仔细看看希腊加入欧元区后近10年来的财政状况，发现不仅希腊自己一手制造了其债务问题，而且其它欧洲国家政府也屡屡对希腊违反规定的作法睁一只眼闭一只眼。虽然欧洲委员会(European Commission)和美联储(U.S. Federal Reserve)正在调查高盛公司(Goldman Sachs Group Inc.)安排的一项有争议的2001年掉期交易，但希腊自己的预算行为也显然违反了欧盟的规定，其影响大大超过此类交易。 希腊面临的这一困境──长年超支让债券投资者担心其无法偿还债务──本不应在欧元区发生。各欧元区国家很早就制订了一个旨在防止任何一个消费无度的国家破坏共同货币的协定。该协定要求采用欧元的国家把年预算赤字控制在国内生产总值(GDP)的3%以内，政府总债务限制在GDP的60%以内。 但向欧盟提交的预算报告显示，除2006年之外，希腊多年来均未遵守赤字规定，其债务从未控制在上限的30个百分点之内。 希腊自1997年以来每年都大幅向上修订其赤字数据。最终数据曾几次达到最初报告数据的四倍。去年底，希腊政府把其2009年预算赤字预估从最初占GDP的3.7%增加到接近GDP的13%，从而引发了当前的危机。 这些修订的影响大大超越了希腊用于帮助掩盖其债务规模和赤字数字的有争议的衍生产品交易的影响。由高盛安排的2001年货币掉期交易帮希腊削减的赤字约占当年GDP的0.1个百分点。相比之下，希腊没有将其2001年的16亿欧元（22亿美元）军事开支入账。欧盟统计局(Eurostat)说，这是衍生品交易削减金额的10倍。 法国股票市场监管机构主席朱叶(Jean-Pierre Jouyet)说，希腊问题表明，欧盟金融机构没有足够的权力或专业技能来防止成员国违规。欧盟需要新的手段来管理这种失衡状态，因为没有惩罚机制的协定不足以防范这些问题。他曾任前欧洲委员会主席德洛尔(Jacques Delors)的幕僚长。 
Associated Press
1996年，时任德国总理的科尔和法国总统希拉克在都柏林峰会上会面。
帕帕佐普洛斯是希腊现在的执政党──泛希腊社会主义运动的成员之一。他说，大多数的修订是因为2004年上台的新民主党(New Democracy)修改了过去处理军事支出的方式。他说这影响了希腊政府过去记录的预算赤字。但欧盟统计局认为这些修订是必需的，因为希腊大大低估了它的军事支出。 报告显示，希腊并不是唯一一个违反欧元区规定的国家：大多数其它欧元区成员几年来也曾至少一次未达到债务与赤字要求。 欧元1999年诞生时有创始成员国11个，18个月后希腊加入。其诞生过程显示了欧洲各国领导人一种有意而为的政治姿态：欧元这种新生货币的成员国范围应当尽可能地大。尽管意大利和比利时当时远远超过了债务限制，但它们还是被允许随着第一批国家加入欧元区。这一决定也引起了一些争议。 
Associated Press
2000年6月，希腊总理科斯塔斯•西米蒂斯(Costas Simitis)在希腊加入欧元区后举杯祝酒。
希腊的当前危机削弱了欧元，并让人对其他一些欧洲国家的债务水平也感到担忧。危机说明，欧洲大范围推广欧元的政治野心与经济现实产生了碰撞。它还说明，希腊在经济上的成功，一定程度上是建在虚假经济数据上的海市蜃楼。 经济学界和历史学界认为，这源于欧元的一个先天弱点：即缺乏协调的财政政策来与货币统一伴生。2009年出版记载欧元诞生过程的编年史著作《The Euro》(欧元)的作者马什(David Marsh)说，从一开始，欧元就充满了各种未予解决的矛盾。一些政治家认为，货币联盟是把欧盟建成政治联盟的一个途径，其他人则强调财政与货币约束的必要性，这些人主要来自德国。 一旦某个国家加入欧元区，如果它恣意妄为，其他国家也拿它无可奈何，因为欧元的设计师们并没有设计出任何实质性的执法方式。 
Reuters
2002年1月1日，法兰克福燃放焰火庆祝欧元纸币和硬币开始流通。
花旗集团首席经济学家、英国央行(Bank of England)货币政策委员会(Monetary Policy Committee)前委员布伊特(Willem Buiter)说，1996年的协议，是要把债务与赤字规则当成“纸老虎”来执行。 他在一项新的研究报告中写道，协议是无效的，因为它在一段时间里让人误以为，能够改变成员国财政行为的惩罚和奖励措施是存在的，而实际上二者都不存在。 对财政规则的不严肃态度很早就已经存在。为了能够在新世纪以前推出欧元，欧盟各国领导人决定把1997年当成一个关键年。如果大家都能够满足这一年的目标，那么就可以推出欧元。 60%债务率的目标根本无法企及。例如比利时在1995年的债务水平就相当于国内生产总值的131%。各国达成一致，只要看起来是在下降，债务水平过高也可以接受。（作为一个整体的欧元区从来没有满足60%的债务水平限制。） 于是欧洲努力在年度赤字上坚守立场。这导致这一年度内各国财政收入纷纷出现一次性上升。各国都在出售手机频谱牌照。法国从即将私有化的法国电信(France T口l口com)获得了超过50亿欧元的资金，用于承担未来的养老金给付义务。德国尝试重估自己的黄金储备，但没有成功。 受这些办法提振，并在科技行业繁荣的帮助下，12个国家中有11个国家实现了1997年的3%目标。当1999年的新年钟声敲响时，欧元高调诞生，尽管再过了三年后纸币和硬币才开始流通。 之后，各国修正了数据，不过声势要小得多：在最初11个按照1997年数据符合加入欧盟资格的欧盟国家中，有三个国家──西班牙、法国和葡萄牙──后来把1997年赤字数据向上修正至GDP的3%以上。而法国把预算数字向上修正到GDP的3.3%是直到2007年才进行的。 希腊没有赶上第一波加入欧盟。希腊1997年的赤字为GDP的4.0%，和要求差的太远。即使是这样，技术专家官员仍怀疑希腊的统计数字。不过在1999年底，出于让欧元区取得成功的迫切希望，欧盟忽略了这些担忧。希腊1998年的数据看起来有所改善，欧洲国家政府认同希腊达到了财政目标。 他们用希腊1998年赤字降至GDP的2.5%和1999年有望达到1.9%作为证据，并赞扬希腊减少了债务。1999年12月，各国政府联合宣布，希腊1998年赤字低于条约规定的参考值，预计1999年将继续保持住，中期内还会进一步下降。 结果上述说法都不是真的。2000年3月，欧盟统计局说，一个新的会计标准将希腊1998年赤字推高至GDP的3.2%。之后欧盟统计局在2004年的报告中，在希腊1998年原有赤字上又加了近20亿欧元，主要是因为希腊错误地把对国有机构的补贴算做了股权收购──葡萄牙后来也采用过这种方法。最后，1998年的希腊赤字为GDP的4.3%，远远高于加入欧元区的标准。 情况变得越来越糟。欧盟统计局发现，希腊多年来都几乎没有纪录过任何军用设备支出，一直高估了税收收入，没有纪录政府医疗体系中的医院成本，并把欧盟对希腊私营机构的补贴算做了政府收入。 在经济低迷面前，其他国家也陷入了和希腊相同的境遇。2002年、2003年和2004年，法国和德国超过了赤字上限，树立了一个哪怕是欧元区的主要经济体也可以不遵守规定的先例。2003年，荷兰和意大利也超过了赤字上限。比利时前首相德黑尼(Jean-Luc Dehaene)说，当德国和法国陷入麻烦的时候，欧盟并没有作出激烈的反应。 在欧元区早期的12个成员国中，除比利时、卢森堡和芬兰，所有其他国家都至少有一年超过了预算赤字上限。最后，迫于政治压力，赤字上限的要求于2005年被放宽，允许经济低迷时超过赤字上限。 那是在2003年希腊悲喜剧式的赤字数据之后。2004年3月，希腊公布2003年赤字为26亿欧元，相当于GDP的1.7%。欧盟统计局加入了一个脚注，说这个数字是“暂时的”，不过仍远远低于欧元区2.7%的平均水平。 希腊的任何庆祝都是短暂的。两个月后，迫于欧盟统计局的压力，希腊公布了新的数据。2003年赤字被修正为3.2%，原因之一是高估了税收收入和欧盟的补贴。在那之后四个月，数字被修正为4.6%，原因是希腊没有把一些军费支出计算在内，高估了社会保障盈余，低报了利息支出。 2005年3月又进行了一次修正，赤字上升为5.2%。当年晚些时候，赤字变成了5.7%。18个月之前公布的26亿欧元赤字如今变成了88亿欧元。 伦敦政治经济学院(London School of Economics)的Vassilis Monastiriotis说，简而言之，希腊没有奉行欧元区的原则，那就是财政纪律。 |
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