酷悠双语网

 找回密码
 注册
搜索
酷悠双语网 首页 中国 查看内容

中国在应对信贷泡沫问题上面临严峻考验
China faces ‘acid test’ over credit bubble

2017-5-19 16:14| 发布者: 忘忧草| 查看: 89| 评论: 0

摘要: For global investors and, indeed commentators, China remains a fascinating subject and one that carries a health warning.Nearly a third of fund managers say the recent tightening of credit by authorit ...
For global investors and, indeed commentators, China remains a fascinating subject and one that carries a health warning.

Nearly a third of fund managers say the recent tightening of credit by authorities in Beijing, who are taking aim at the shadow banking sector, is now the biggest tail risk for markets, according to a Bank of America Merrill Lynch survey released this week. Not since January of 2016 has China ranked above the threat of a eurozone break-up as the biggest worry for investors.

The catalyst has been Beijing’s belated effort to bring an enormous credit bubble under control. As a result, interbank lending rates have shot up, while five-year bond yields have risen above those of the 10-year sector — both signs of financial tension that reflect the crackdown on leverage.

The broader concern is that a decelerating China, squeezed by tighter financial conditions, represents a double hit to the global reflation trade. It comes just as doubts grow about the ability of the Trump administration to implement pro-growth policies as political controversy sucks up the oxygen in Washington.

What the taming of China’s mighty credit bubble means for the global financial system was very much on the minds of readers who attended an FT event in London this week, which featured George Magnus, an associate at the China Centre at Oxford university. Mr Magnus, who is writing a book about what he describes as the five traps facing China — debt, capital, demographics, middle income and Thucydides, faced an audience looking for insight on these and other topics.

Kicking the event off, I asked the audience whether they thought China was a bubble. More than half of the 70 people in attendance raised a hand.

Characterised by a series of ferocious asset price surges in recent years spanning equities, property, commodities, and even bitcoin, it’s hard not to dismiss anxiety about bubbles whenever the conversation turns to China.

The explosion of credit has been powering China’s economy in recent years. When measured against GDP, the ratio of credit has jumped from 141 per cent at the start of 2009, to 260 per cent by the end of 2016.

Not surprisingly both the IMF and BIS have expressed alarm at China’s credit gap, or the deviation of credit growth from its long-term trend. The IMF warned last year, China’s credit gap is very high when compared ‘’to countries that experienced painful deleveraging, such as Spain, Thailand, or Japan’’.

For all the mind-boggling numbers on debt, the excessive use of leverage and an explosion in the use of off-balance sheet wealth management products, few investors expect a macro shock ahead of China’s 19th party congress this autumn. One major difference between now and the recent bouts of turmoil is a stable renminbi and a cessation of capital outflows.

That has eased the risk of a global deflationary shock, a prospect that animated international markets at the start of 2016 and, just as violently, in August of 2015, when the renminbi was suddenly devalued.

Yet as China keeps the pressure on its shadow banking sector, domestic investors may begin to be tempted by foreign assets and, as analysts at UBS recently noted: ‘’thereby putting pressure on the currency and changing the game’’.

Perhaps. But as Mr Magnus told the FT audience, any dramatic slowing of the economy this summer before the congress will prompt Beijing to back off from squeezing liquidity conditions too hard.

A sense that China can muddle through and keep the debt show on the road was also reflected by some in the audience. Given that much of the debt sits with state-owned entities or those backed by the government, there’s no reason to think a western style banking insolvency crisis that takes the economy with it will arise any time soon.

Not so fast, responds Mr Magnus, warning that the shadowy financing of the debt through interbank and repo lending is an Achilles heel for China. The funding structure of such liabilities does have a timeline that is much more immediate than the state rolling over SOE and bank debts. A shadow-funding crunch with lenders steadily shut out of the system, and going bust with potentially dire consequences for the rest of the financial system could well play out between six months and two years from now, he estimates.

That’s why the decisions taken at the congress later this year will be pivotal for understanding the long-term fallout from years of easy money and rampant credit creation.

Whether Beijing is genuinely serious about tackling the credit bubble at the cost of economic growth sliding well below the current target of 6.5 per cent represents an ‘’acid test’’ says Mr Magnus. ‘You can’t resolve a debt problem peacefully,’ he adds.

对于全球投资者,甚至是全球评论家来说,中国仍是一个非常迷人的课题,但同时也带有一个健康警告。

据美银美林(Bank of America Merrill Lynch)本周发布的一项调查,近三分之一的基金经理表示,近期正将矛头对准影子银行领域的中国有关部门对信贷的收紧,现已成为市场最大的尾部风险。而自2016年1月以来,投资者的头号担忧对象一直是欧元区解体危机,而不是中国。

风险的催化剂就是北京方面一项迟来的行动:对巨大的信贷泡沫进行控制。结果导致银行同业拆借利率激增,五年期国债收益率已超过那些十年期的,这两项金融紧张的迹象都反映了对杠杆的打击。

更广泛的担忧是受金融环境紧缩影响,中国经济增长不断减速,这意味着对全球实现通货再膨胀努力的双重打击。因为就在此时,政治争议吸引了华盛顿方面的全部注意力,导致特朗普政府实施促进增长政策的能力成疑。

因此,在本周参加英国《金融时报》伦敦一场活动的读者看来,驯服中国巨大的信贷泡沫对全球金融体系具有巨大意义。此次活动的重要嘉宾乔治?马格纳斯(George Magnus)是牛津大学(Oxford University)中国中心(China Centre)研究员,他目前正撰写一部著作,其内容是关于中国所面临的五个陷阱:债务陷阱、资本陷阱、人口陷阱、中等收入陷阱和修昔底德陷阱。观众们希望听到他对这些问题以及其他话题的深刻见解。

活动开场后,主持人询问观众是否认为中国的情况构成泡沫,70名观众中一半以上的人都举起了手。

近年来中国以一系列资产价格猛增著称,其范围涵盖了股票、房地产、大宗商品,甚至是比特币,因此每当谈话转向中国时,很难不去理会人们对泡沫的担忧。

近年来,信贷爆发一直是中国经济的动力。如果与国内生产总值(GDP)作比,信贷比例从2009年初的141%,上涨至2016年底的260%。

无怪乎国际货币基金组织(IMF)和国际清算银行(BIS)都对中国的信贷扩张差额,即信贷增长与其长期增长趋势的偏差提出警告。IMF去年就警告说,与“经历过痛苦的去杠杆化的国家,比如西班牙、泰国或日本相比”,中国的信贷扩张差额非常大。

虽然存在令人难以置信的信贷数额,对杠杆的过度使用,以及对表外理财产品运用的暴增,但很少有投资者认为今年秋季中共十九大召开前宏观经济会出现动荡。现在与近期几次动荡相比,一个主要区别是人民币稳定,资本流出停止。

这缓解了爆发一场全球通缩冲击的风险,2016年初以及2015年8月人民币突然贬值时,这一前景曾有力地提振了国际市场。

但是,随着中国继续对影子银行部门施加压力,国内投资者或将开始受到境外资产诱惑,正如瑞银(UBS)分析师最近指出的:“从而对人民币造成压力,改变形势”。

或许吧。但正如马格纳斯对英国《金融时报》的听众所言,十九大召开前,中国经济今夏如出现任何大幅放缓,都将促使北京方面放弃以过强力度挤压流动性的努力。

部分听众的感觉是,中国能够应对过去,并避免债务问题失控。鉴于大部分债务是国有实体或政府支持的实体的负债,没有理由认为中国经济很快将爆发一场西方式的银行破产危机。

不会那么快地发生,马格纳斯回应道,他警告,通过银行间同业拆放和回购为偿债获得影子融资,是中国的一个致命弱点。这类债务的融资结构确实有一个偿还时间表,期限比针对国有企业和银行债务的国家展期短得多。他估计,影子银行融资出现危机(因放款机构不断关闭这一体系),进而发生可能对整个金融体系造成可怕后果的崩盘,很可能在从现在起6个月至两年的时间内上演。

正由于这个原因,今年晚些时候召开的十九大做出的决定,将对理解多年宽松货币政策和泛滥的信贷制造带来的长期影响至关重要。

马格纳斯说,北京是否真的愿意以经济增长下滑至远低于当前6.5%的目标之下为代价解决这一信贷泡沫,代表着一场“严峻考验”,“你不可能悄无声息地解决一场债务危机”。

译者/何黎


路过

雷人

鲜花

鸡蛋

最新评论

QQ|Archiver|小黑屋|酷悠双语网 ( 京ICP备09072739号

GMT+8, 2017-5-24 08:23

Powered by Discuz! X3.3

© 2001-2017 Comsenz Inc.

返回顶部